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Abstract This article aims at taking stock of the Brexit developments thus far and
provides the readers with an analysis of how, broadly understood, immigration has
contributed to the results of the referendum and what role it plays in the negotiations
between the EU and the UK.
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1 Introduction
Brexit negotiations, as anticipated, have proved to be a very complicated and multi-
faceted affair.1 One of the most controversial items on the agenda of the negotiating
teams has been the rights of EU migrating citizens residing in the United Kingdom as
well as UK nationals, who have been exercising their free movement rights in one of
the Member States of the European Union. This dossier was bound to stir controver-
sies from the start.2 Alas, the pre-referendum debate, as well as events that unfolded
in its aftermath, have turned Cives Europae into bargaining chips. Whatever the out-
come of these negotiations, or—in more general terms—Brexit itself, it is likely to
leave a bitter aftertaste. This article aims at taking stock of the developments thus far
1See, exempli gratia, Fabrini [12]; Hillman/Horlick [18]; Dougan [8]; Emerson [10]; Peers/Harvey [35],
p. 815. On EU withdrawal but in more general terms see, inter alia, Tatham [40], p. 128; Hillion [17],
p. 142.
2See further Hughes [20], p. 94; Rieder [37], p. 147; Ederveen [9]; Łazowski [26], p. 523.
B A. Łazowski
A.Lazowski@westminster.ac.uk
1 Professor of European Union Law, Westminster Law School, University of Westminster,
London, UK
470 A. Łazowski
and provides the readers with an analysis of how, broadly understood, immigration
has contributed to the results of referendum (Sect. 2) and what role it plays in the
negotiations between the EU and the UK (Sect. 3).3 In the latter part, the analysis
will cover the tentative agreement on the status of EU/UK citizens post-Brexit. While
the deal was reached in December 2017 and a draft Withdrawal Agreement was pre-
sented in February 2018, there were still leftovers to be dealt with in the course of
2018. Furthermore, the entry into force of the Withdrawal Agreement should not be
treated as a fait accompli. Bearing this in mind, the readers are also offered an anal-
ysis of a hypothetical—for the time being—scenario of an unregulated withdrawal.
Furthermore, a transitional period, which was being contemplated when this article
was finalised, is also taken on board.
2 Free movement of persons before and after the Brexit referendum
2.1 Build-up to the referendum
As far as we can trace back the history of humankind, people have been migrating.4
Thus, this phenomenon is not, by any stretch of the imagination, an idiosyncrasy of
the 20th and 21st century, but rather a process that goes back much longer. While the
political, economic and technological environments have changed, the main reasons
behind the migratory movements have—in general terms—stayed the same. People
have moved around to conquer others’ territories, in search of food, commodities,
commerce or, to put it simply, in search of a better life. New modes of transport
and technical innovations, which were developed in the 20th century, have also fed
tourism, which over the past decades has become a commodity of its own. To put it
differently, humans have become infected with a highly contagious disease frequently
referred to as travelitis furiosus, which can be loosely translated as a difficult to sus-
tain urge to travel.5 Within the European Union, the movement of persons across the
borders has been considerably liberalised qua freedoms of the internal market as well
as by the lifting of border controls as per the Schengen acquis.6 When it comes to the
first, the key roles are played by free movement of workers, the right of establishment
and the free movement of services. These three fundamental freedoms complement
one another and have gone through a considerable evolution since the early days of
the European Communities. The Treaty of Maastricht added a cherry to that cake:
the concept of EU citizenship. While many political circles have treated it as mere
shop window dressing, for the Court of Justice it has been a great opportunity to pro-
ceed with a pro-integration jurisprudence, putting the flesh on the bones of a skeleton
3The cut-off date for the present analysis is 26 February 2018.
4On history of migrations see, inter alia, Manning [30].
5As noted by G. Mikes, ‘”Travel” is the name of a modern disease which became rampant in the mid-
fifties and is still spreading. The disease—its scientific name is travelitis furious—is carried by a germ
called prosperity.’ See further Mikes [32], p. 105.
6See further on the evolution of Schengen acquis and its incorporation into the EU legal order Peers [34].
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concept.7 One should also remember that the Treaty of Maastricht has facilitated
development of EU secondary legislation dealing with the rights of third country na-
tionals.8 As expected, however, the free movement rights raise, in equal measure,
excitement and anxiety. Arguably, the results of the Brexit referendum demonstrate
the preponderance of the latter over the former. To put it differently, immigration has
proven to be one of the leitmotifs of the referendum campaign and, consequentially,
one of the reasons why the majority of voters, however slim, has opted for leaving the
European Union.9 In order to appreciate that phenomenon, it is worth taking a closer
look at the big picture, as it will provide a systemic background to the analysis that
follows.
Since its creation in the 1950s, the European Communities (now the European
Union) have progressed towards creation of the common market, later rebranded the
internal market. Part and parcel of it, as noted above, are the free movement rights.
The early secondary legislation shows that uncontrolled migration between the orig-
inal six Member States was definitely feared. This was reflected in, exempli gratia,
narrowing down of the freedom of movement to those economically active; and fur-
thermore, by limiting its scope to those who benefited from job offers made before
embarking on a journey to another Member State.10 While the latter condition was
quickly dropped, other types of migratory movements remained governed by Mem-
ber State national laws. It was only in the late 1980s that things started to change.
Firstly, the Council adopted a package of three directives on non-economic residence
rights.11 Secondly, as mentioned above, the Member States laid down the foundations
for EU citizenship, with its flagship right to move and reside freely across the Mem-
ber States.12 Changes in EU law have been accompanied by dramatic expansion of
EU membership, which considerably increased the number of people entitled to the
rights in question. As well-known, the European Communities (the Union) have ex-
panded since the early days of an exclusive club of six to a total of 28 Member States,
with the population exceeding 500 million people.13 Seven enlargement rounds cov-
ered not only rich countries but also the ones, which at the time of accession—and
for years thereafter—had much lower GDP. This, for reasons which need no expla-
nation, became one of the major factors dominating their rapprochement to the Eu-
ropean Communities (Union). On the one hand, it was an ultimate incentive to per-
suade their populations of the benefits of European integration. On the other hand, it
7See, exempli gratia, Case C-85/96 María Martínez Sala v Freistaat Bayern, EU:C:1998:217; Case C-
413/99 Baumbast and R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, EU:C:2002:493; Case C-34/09
Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office national de l’emploi (ONEm), EU:C:2011:124; Case C-192/05 K. Tas-
Hagen and R. A. Tas v Raadskamer WUBO van de Pensioen- en Uitkeringsraad, EU:C:2006:676.
8This comprises, exempli gratia, EU legislation on visas, asylum and immigration. See further Peers [34].
9For an academic appraisal see, inter alia, Clarke/Goodwin/Whiteley [4].
10Règlement n° 15 relatif aux premières mesures pour la réalisation de la libre circulation des travailleurs
à l’intérieur de la Communauté [1961] OJ 57/1073.
11Council Directive 90/364/EEC of 28 June 1990 on the right of residence [1990] OJ L 180/26; Council
Directive 90/365/EEC of 28 June 1990 on the right of residence for employees and self-employed persons
who have ceased their occupational activity [1990] OJ L 180/28; Council Directive 93/96/EEC of 29
October 1993 on the right of residence for students [1993] OJ L 31759.
12See van der Harst/Hoogers/Voerman [41].
13For a comprehensive analysis of EU enlargements see, inter alia, Tatham [39].
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was a source of major concern among the existing and considerably better-off Mem-
ber States. Hence, in order to square the circle, the European Communities (Union)
decided to add to the enlargement toolkit a set of multi-annual transitional periods
permitting the Member States, both old and new, to provide for interim arrangements
facilitating gradual phasing-in of free movement rights after accession. However, the
said transitional periods were limited in time, with no permanent opt-outs from the
free movement of workers available on the menu.14 With the big-bang enlargement of
2004,15 the transitional regime in question has become a standard feature of the Ac-
cession Treaties, repeated in the cases of Bulgaria and Romania (2007)16 and Croatia
(2013).17 This trend is likely to continue if/when the next rounds of enlargement take
place.18
While the idiosyncrasies of the enlargement policy deserve no further exploration
in this article, it merits attention that the opening of the United Kingdom’s labour
market as of 1 May 2004 contributed considerably to the pre-referendum debate and
14Furthermore, the transitional regimes were limited to free movement of workers. Au contraire, neither of
the recent Accession Treaties provided for general restrictions to the right of establishment. See Goldner
Lang [14].
15Treaty between the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany,
the Hellenic Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the French Republic, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the Grand
Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Republic of Austria, the Portuguese Republic,
the Republic of Finland, the Kingdom of Sweden, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland (Member States of the European Union) and the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the
Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the
Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia, the Slovak Republic, concerning the
accession of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia,
the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the
Republic of Slovenia and the Slovak Republic to the European Union [2003] OJ L 236/17. See, inter alia,
Inglis [21], p. 937; Hillion [16], p. 583.
16Treaty between the Kingdom of Belgium, the Czech Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal
Republic of Germany, the Republic of Estonia, the Hellenic Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the French
Republic, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of
Lithuania, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Kingdom
of the Netherlands, the Republic of Austria, the Republic of Poland, the Portuguese Republic, the Republic
of Slovenia, the Slovak Republic, the Republic of Finland, the Kingdom of Sweden, the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (Member States of the European Union) and the Republic of Bulgaria
and Romania, concerning the accession of the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania to the European Union
[2005] OJ L157/11. See, inter alia, Łazowski [23], p. 401.
17Treaty between the Kingdom of Belgium, the Republic of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, the Kingdom
of Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Estonia, Ireland, the Hellenic Republic,
the Kingdom of Spain, the French Republic, the Italian Republic, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic
of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Republic of Hungary, the
Republic of Malta, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Republic of Austria, the Republic of Poland, the
Portuguese Republic, Romania, the Republic of Slovenia, the Slovak Republic, the Republic of Finland,
the Kingdom of Sweden, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (Member States of
the European Union) and the Republic of Croatia concerning the accession of the Republic of Croatia to
the European Union [2012] OJ L112/10. For an academic appraisal, see Łazowski [25], p. 1.
18According to the European Commission, the next enlargement may take place around 2025. This,
however, is subject to a successful completion of the accession negotiations and ratification of acces-
sion treaty(ties). It should be emphasised that neither of the two should be taken for granted. See further
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European and Social
Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A credible enlargement perspective for and enhanced EU
engagement with the Western Balkans, COM (2018) 65 final.
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cast a shadow on its results. While the campaign painfully lacked attention to detail
and facts, it is unquestionable that in the past 10 years many Central and Eastern Eu-
ropean citizens have put down roots in the United Kingdom.19 Not for the first and
not for the last time migratory movements have altered the social fabric of the British
Isles. Furthermore, one should not forget the immigration from third countries, in-
cluding the United Kingdom’s former colonies.20 Alas, immigration has become a
toxic topic in public discourse and, to make things worse, a subject of unrealistic
pledges made by the political elites. Instead of having a merit-based discussion about
the benefits and the disadvantages of immigration, the voters were exposed to vari-
ous versions of simplified and non-data based truths and assumptions that foreigners
contribute little to the UK budget but, instead, milk the allegedly generous social
system. The media coverage was frequently twisted, largely negative and consequen-
tially contributed to this state of affairs. In such a political climate, the then Prime
Minister David Cameron engaged in renegotiation of the UK’s membership in the
European Union.21 At the same time, a pledge to hold a referendum on the future
of UK membership of the EU was made.22 For many this was yet another case of
UK’s exceptionalism and one more attempt at securing additional opt-outs from the
mainstream integration endeavour.23 Driven by an unrealistic pledge to cap immigra-
tion numbers and without a clear agenda for renegotiation, the Prime Minister failed
to secure major concessions from his European partners, yet managed to negotiate a
few idiosyncratic rules, which he subsequently failed to sell persuasively to members
of the public.24 The rest is history.25 On 23 June 2016, by a slim majority, voters ex-
pressed a desire to leave the European Union, and, by the same token, to give up their
EU citizenship.26 As noted above, immigration was one of the dominating themes
during the pre-referendum campaign.27 To use the words of H. Brady, the debate
‘has generated more heat than light’.28 As noted by the present author in one of the
earlier publications, the referendum itself raises doubts as to its democratic creden-
tials, and, not surprisingly, this is inextricably linked to the substance of this article.29
A source of concern was the franchise, which excluded many beneficiaries of the EU
free movement rights. To begin with, UK nationals, who have resided for over 15
19See House of Lords, Brexit: UK and EU movement of people, HL Paper 121, 2017, available at: https://
publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201617/ldselect/ldeucom/121/121.pdf.
20See House of Lords: Brexit and the Labour Market, HL Paper 11, available at: available at: https://
publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201719/ldselect/ldeconaf/11/11.pdf, at p. 21.
21As argued by some authors, the free movement of persons could have been limited without such complex
negotiations. See Davies [7], p. 925.
22See further, inter alia, Copsey/Haughton [5].
23See further, inter alia, Łazowski [29].
24See further, inter alia, Weiss/Blockmans [44], pp. 8–11.
25On the political position of the UK in the EU around the time of negotiations see, inter alia, Kluger
Rasmussen [22].
26For an appraisal of the referendum see, inter alia, Clarke/Goodwin/Whiteley [4].
27For a detailed account see, inter alia, Armstrong [1], pp. 73–85.
28Brady [3], p. 28.
29Łazowski [27].
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years outside the United Kingdom, had no right to vote. Furthermore, the EU citizens
who exercised their fundamental right to move and have settled in the United King-
dom have been also deprived of voting rights. To make matters worse, the United
Kingdom quietly tightened domestic rules on naturalisation.30 The timing and me-
chanics of the latter move left little doubt that the raison d’être behind the change
was to stop EU citizens from acquiring UK citizenship and thus the right to vote in
the forthcoming referendum. All in all, over 4 million people, whose residence rights
have been put into question by the referendum results, had no say in what was meant
to be an ultimate exercise in direct democracy. And, with the Brexit process unravel-
ling, they have become bargaining chips as a consequence of being Cives Europae,
who had exercised the rights stemming from their fundamental status.
2.2 The morning, the week, the month, the year after. . .
Not surprisingly, the referendum was followed by political turmoil. In the midst of
unprecedented political crisis, calls were made to guarantee the acquired rights of
EU/UK citizens. Alas, they fell on the deaf ears of the newly appointed government
of Theresa May, whose anti-immigration prejudice was well-known from her pre-
vious job as Home Office Secretary.31 On the one hand, the government at regular
intervals repeated statements emphasising appreciation for migrant workers support-
ing the British economy.32 On the other hand, no clear confirmation of guaranteed
rights followed. Not surprisingly, EU citizens rushed to obtain permanent residence
cards, which—as per Directive 2004/38/EC—have merely a declaratory character.33
Yet, under the circumstances, many applicants believed that the cards in question
guaranteed an additional safety net at very uncertain times. It is notable that issu-
ing of permanent residence cards is left in the hands of the Member States, while
Directive 2004/38/EC provides only a very general framework.34 It quickly turned
out that the modus operandi envisaged by the UK legislation was tedious and time-
consuming as if it were made to dissuade any potential applicants. To make things
worse, it also proved to be far too demanding for the UK immigration authorities.35
30As of the autumn of 2015, EU citizens who wish to become naturalised need to obtain, as the first step,
a permanent residence card, which—in accordance with Directive 2004/38/EC is not compulsory.
31See Wintour [46].
32Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Prime Minister’s Office, 10 Downing Street, Department for Exit-
ing the European Union, The Rt Hon Theresa May MP, PM’s Florence speech: a new era of coopera-
tion and partnership between the UK and the EU, 22 September 2017, https://www.gov.uk/government/
speeches/pms-florence-speech-a-new-era-of-cooperation-and-partnership-between-the-uk-and-the-eu. For
a commentary see, inter alia, Emerson [11].
33See Art. 25 of Directive 2004/38/EC (Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Coun-
cil of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely
within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives
64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC
and 93/96/EEC [2004] OJ L 158/77). For an academic appraisal see, inter alia, Guild/Peers/Tomkin [15],
pp. 241–242.
34It should be noted that Directive 2004/38/EC provides only for a minimum standard and, as per Arti-
cle 37, the Member States may provide for a more generous regime in their national laws. See further,
Guild/Peers/Tomkin [15], pp. 241–242.
35See Warrel [42].
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Some EU citizens opted for naturalisation in order to make sure that their rights are
protected. This, however, means that they de-activated their EU free movement rights,
even though their spouses may still, qua creative jurisprudence of the Court of Jus-
tice, benefit from rights derived as per Article 21 TFEU.36 In more general terms,
the Brexit vote exacerbated anti-immigration sentiments with a considerable spike of
hate crime. Furthermore, many media outlets, in particular the tabloid newspapers,
followed suit and continued to picture immigrants as benefit dodgers, milking the
UK social protection system. All of this took place against the solid evidence proving
a plausible contribution of EU migrating workers and self-employed to the British
economy.37 Furthermore, many a time the free movement of persons was presented
in a one-sided fashion, as if the same rules did not apply to UK citizens migrating
to other EU Member States. Arguably, an interesting semantic phenomenon emerged
in the public discourse. While the EU citizens residing in the United Kingdom were
labelled as ‘immigrants’, the UK citizens enjoying their fundamental EU right in
one of the other Member States were referred to as ‘expats’. It is against this gen-
eral background that the negotiations of withdrawal negotiations commenced. Not
surprisingly, the question of acquired rights of EU citizens in the UK, and the UK
citizens in the EU, has been placed at the top of the agenda. At the same time, the
rights of EEA-EFTA countries citizens residing in the UK (and UK citizens residing
in the EEA-EFTA countries) as well as the status of the Swiss nationals residing in
the UK (and UK citizens in Switzerland) were left untouched in a fairly nonchalant
fashion.38
3 Free movement of persons in Brexit negotiations
3.1 Brexit negotiations: the basics
Even though the withdrawal procedure has a legal basis in EU Treaties, Article 50
TEU fails to address all pertinent issues, leaving much room for manoeuvre to the
European Union.39 This extends, exampli gratia, to the choice of dossiers covered
by the negotiations and the sequencing of withdrawal talks. The European Union has
been granted additional flexibility by the UK government, which has proven to be
patently unprepared for what has unraveled after the referendum. The sequencing
has been of high importance, particularly because the European Union has insisted
on a phased-in approach. To put it differently, the negotiations have been divided
into two phases: the first devoted to terms of withdrawal and the second dedicated
36See Case C-165/16 Toufik Lounes v Secretary of State for the Home Department, EU:C:2017:862.
37See House of Lords: Brexit and the Labour Market, HL Paper 11, 2017, available at: https://publications.
parliament.uk/pa/ld201719/ldselect/ldeconaf/11/11.pdf.
38See very vocal criticism of this state of affairs: House of Commons, Home Affairs Committee,
Home Office Delivery of Brexit: Immigration, HC 421, available at: https://publications.parliament.uk/
pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmhaff/421/421.pdf.
39As painfully proven during the negotiations with the United Kingdom, a departing country is by default
in a much weaker position without a real impact on key procedural and substantive decisions regarding the
exit negotiations.
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to nitty-gritty details and a framework for future relations.40 It should be noted that
the opening of the second phase was made conditional on ‘sufficient progress’ in
the early talks. Not surprisingly, the free movement of persons has been addressed
in the opening phase, alongside the UK contributions to the EU budget and the bor-
der between the UK and Ireland. As argued by P. Craig, ‘the position of EU cit-
izens living in the UK, and UK citizens living in the EU, is regarded as central
to the withdrawal agreement by both sides’.41 When this article went to print, the
basic elements of the deal have been agreed to. A breakthrough came just ahead
of the European Council meeting in December 2017, while the first draft of the
Withdrawal Agreement was published by the European Commission on 28 Febru-
ary 2018.42
In order to fully appreciate the idiosyncrasies of the agreed solutions it is neces-
sary, as the first step, to take a closer look at the negotiating positions of both sides.
Bearing in mind the post-referendum political shenanigans in the United Kingdom, it
is hardly surprising that the European Union commenced the negotiations with a clear
vision of what it wished to achieve, while Whitehall drowned in internal political ne-
gotiations within the ruling Conservative Party. A cacophony of ideas has quickly
become spécialité de la maison of the UK Government, with floods of incoherent
statements emerging from various members of the cabinet, including the Prime Min-
ister herself.43 While the negotiating position of the EU in the area of free movement
of persons proved to be strong and stable, the opening stance of the United King-
dom was weak and wobbly. Perhaps the most striking example was the state of the
art in February 2018, when the European Union was ready to commence the second
phase of withdrawal negotiations and preparation of negotiation positions was in full
swing, while the UK government had no firm idea of plans ahead and the members
of the government were busy delivering Brexit speeches, instead of getting on with
the negotiations and other Brexit related challenges.44 Irrespective of that, one thing
was clear for both sides: one of the most essential issues to be tackled in the Brexit
40See paras. 4–7 of Guidelines of the European Council.
41Craig [6], p. 1.
42European Commission Draft Withdrawal Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Commu-
nity, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/publications/draft-withdrawal-agreement-withdrawal-
united-kingdom-great-britain-and-northern-ireland-european-union-and-european-atomic-energy-
community_en.
43For instance during weekly questions to the Prime Minister at the House of Commons on 11 Octo-
ber 2017, the Prime Minister T. May said: ‘On the second point, I made very clear—perhaps I need just
to explain it again to members of the Opposition—that when we leave the European Union in March
2019, we will cease to be full members of the single market and the customs union. That will happen
because you cannot be full members of the single market and the customs union without accepting all
four pillars—free movement; continued, in perpetuity, European Court of Justice jurisdiction. During
the implementation period, we will be looking to get an agreement that we can operate on much the
same basis as we operate at the moment—under the same rules and regulations—but that will not be the
same as full membership of the customs union and the single market’. See https://hansard.parliament.uk/
commons/2017-10-11/debates/853E0598-0872-46DA-8734-360429BA8232/Engagements.
44See Barber [2].
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negotiations had to be the rights of EU/UK citizens.45 This, however, as acutely put
by J. Shaw, amounted to ‘navigating an archipelago of contradictions’.46 As the ne-
gotiations commenced it became abundantly clear that ‘it is [. . . ] often easier to agree
on general propositions than their detailed meaning’.47
3.2 Negotiating positions
When it comes to the European Union, the most crucial decisions related to Brexit are
taken by the European Council. This is not only dictated by its composition and for-
mal role in the institutional line-up but, first and foremost, by its mandate, explicitly
included in Article 50 TEU.48 A key role is also envisaged for the European Com-
mission, which conducts the withdrawal negotiations.49 As per Article 50 TEU, for a
withdrawal agreement to enter into force there is need not only for a decision of the
Council but also consent by the European Parliament. Although the latter plays no
formal role in the exit negotiations, it has proved to be a very active and vocal player
ever since the United Kingdom held the referendum. As noted by K.A. Armstrong,
‘the EP’s role is an oversight and scrutiny role rather than a “negotiating” role’.50
Still, however, it has been using its political power of persuasion in a consistent fash-
ion.
On the EU side the fundamental principles and objectives of the withdrawal nego-
tiations are outlined in several documents. In political terms, the most important are
the Guidelines of the European Council on Brexit negotiations, which were adopted
on 29 April 2017 (and updated on 15 December 2017 to take into account opening
of the second phase of the withdrawal negotiations).51 As already noted, the Guide-
lines envisaged a phased-in approach to the exit talks and made clear that the priority
of the first phase will be to give clarity and certainty to EU citizens.52 Furthermore,
the Guidelines left little doubt that when it comes to EU/UK citizens, who exercise
their rights before the withdrawal actually takes place, the European Union will aim
to maintain a status quo. According to the European Council ‘the first priority of the
negotiations’ are the ‘reciprocal guarantees to safeguard the status and rights derived
from EU law at the date of withdrawal of EU and UK citizens’.53 This desiderata was
clarified further in the negotiation mandate for the European Commission, which was
45For an overview of political and legal issues, which are at stake see, inter alia, House of Lords, Brexit:
acquired rights, 2016, available at: https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201617/ldselect/ldeucom/
82/82.pdf.
46Shaw [38], p. 156.
47Craig [6], p. 31.
48For a comprehensive analysis of European Council and its position in the institutional system of the
European Union see, inter alia, Wessels [45].
49From the institutional point of view the negotiations are conducted largely in accordance with the modus
operandi envisaged for the conclusion of international agreements with third countries.
50Armstrong [1], p. 260.
51European Council (Art. 50) meeting (15 December 2017)—Guidelines, EUCO XT 20011/17.
52European Council Guidelines, p. 2.
53European Council Guidelines, para. 8.
478 A. Łazowski
approved in May 2017.54 For instance, it envisaged that the negotiated agreement
should have the same personal scope as Directive 2004/38/EC; furthermore it should
cover a rich envelope of rights, which are derived from EU primary and secondary
legislation. The European Parliament had proceeded along the same lines, even before
the Guidelines of the European Council were approved.55 This is hardly surprising,
bearing in mind that it represents EU citizens and very often picks up a banner for
their rights.
The negotiating position of the United Kingdom was not as straight-forward as
one could have hoped for. In February 2017 the UK Government published a White
Paper, which was aimed at setting out the negotiation strategy and UK’s objectives for
future relations with the European Union.56 While it shed some light, it did lack detail
and credible options for the future.57 Furthermore, as argued by some commentators,
it was a re-jigged version of the Prime Minister’s earlier Lancaster House speech.58
More details emerged only in June 2017, when the UK Government published its
position on safeguarding the rights of EU/UK citizens. While its conciliatory tone
was clearly visible from the opening pages,59 some of the red lines related to the
acquired rights, in particular in relation to the Court of Justice and its jurisdiction,
made one wonder whether a compromise was feasible at all.
With the negotiating positions in place, both sides embarked on the negotiations,
which were bound to be underpinned by very high levels of complexity. In substan-
tive terms the talks encompassed the residence rights of EU/UK citizens post-Brexit,
including their family members (irrespective of their nationality). Furthermore, the
talks also extended to social rights, covering co-ordination of the social security sys-
tems, access to benefits and equal treatment of EU students regarding fees at English
Universities, continuation of the EU health card regime and recognition of profes-
sional qualifications. The negotiation dossiers also covered the procedural aspects of
post-Brexit residence rights, their enforcement in national courts as well as the sta-
54Council Directives XT 21016/17 of 22 May 2017 for the negotiation of an agreement with the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal from the
European Union, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21766/directives-for-the-negotiation-xt21016-
ad01re02en17.pdf.
55European Parliament resolution P8_TA-PROV (2017)0102 of 5 April 2017 on negotiations with the
United Kingdom following its notification that it intends to withdraw from the European Union, available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+TA+P8-TA-2017-0102+0+





57For a commentary see, inter alia, Craig [6], pp. 11–14; Polak [36], p. 1.
58As noted by Craig, it was ‘in effect, the Lancaster House speech fleshed out with more facts and figures’.
See Craig [6], p. 11.
59For instance, the UK Government declared that: ‘we will do all we can to provide reassurance to the EU
citizens who have made the UK their home, and likewise for UK nationals who have done the same in coun-
tries across the EU’. See UK Government: The United Kingdom’s Exit from the European Union. Safe-
guarding the Position of EU Citizens Living in the UK and UK Nationals Living in the EU, Cm 9464, June
2017, p. 3, available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/safeguarding-the-position-of-eu-
citizens-in-the-uk-and-uk-nationals-in-the-eu.
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tus of case-law of the Court of Justice in the UK and its jurisdiction vis-à-vis the
UK courts. The complexity of the withdrawal talks in the area in question not only
resulted from the impressive list of dossiers that had to be attended to but also possi-
ble scenarios, which had to be taken into account by the negotiators. This included,
exempli gratia, the status of EU/UK citizens who exercised their rights before the ref-
erendum, both those benefiting from permanent residence qua Directive 2004/38/EC
but also those who—by the time of withdrawal—had not yet resided for the neces-
sary qualifying five years. Furthermore, the negotiators had to address the rights of
EU/UK citizens who opted to exercise their rights after the referendum but before
Brexit. It should be noted that the status of EU citizens who arrive after Brexit was
not subject to the negotiations of the Withdrawal Agreement and would be tackled,
if at all, only in a treaty regulating future relations between the European Union and
the United Kingdom.
3.3 Post-referendum status of EU/UK citizens exercising their free movement
rights before the withdrawal (or expiry of the transitional period)
The negotiations of the main dossiers pencilled in for the first phase of the with-
drawal negotiations took place in the summer and autumn of 2017. As expected, it
was not easy to accommodate the red lines laid down by the European Union and
the United Kingdom, yet eventually adequate progress was made in order to proceed
to the second phase of the withdrawal talks. In early December 2017 the European
Commission published its Communication on the progress in withdrawal talks and
both sides published a Joint Report.60 The latter provided an overview of the agreed
arrangements, while further details were left to the next phase of the exit talks. This
was turned into a proper legal text and, as noted above, published by the European
Commission as the Draft Withdrawal Agreement.
The parties unequivocally agreed that the objective of the agreed regime is to pro-
vide reciprocal protection of EU citizens in the United Kingdom and UK citizens in
the European Union. The solutions envisaged in the future Withdrawal Agreement
apply, however, only to those who exercise their rights before the ‘specified date’.
This term was coined by the United Kingdom in the already mentioned paper of June
2017 on the free movement of persons and was meant to cover a date somewhere
between the date of notification of intention to withdraw (29 March 2017) and the
date of exit.61 It should be noted that the United Kingdom eventually gave in and
agreed to the EU’s firm stance that the ‘specified date’ should mean the date of with-
drawal from the European Union. However, the European Commission made it clear
that, if a tailor-made transitional period were to be agreed, the ‘specified date’ would
be the end of such a temporary regime. This was reflected in the Draft Withdrawal
Agreement.62
60Communication from the Commission to the European Council (Article 50) on the state of progress of
the negotiations with the United Kingdom under Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union, COM (2017)
784 final.
61See UK Government: The United Kingdom’s Exit from the European Union. Safeguarding the Position
of EU Citizens Living in the UK and UK Nationals Living in the EU, Cm 9464, June 2017, pp. 4–5.
62See, inter alia, Art. 9 of the Draft Withdrawal Agreement.
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According to Article 9 of the Draft Withdrawal Agreement, the personal scope of
the post-Brexit rights of those who exercise their free movement rights in accordance
with EU law before the end of the transitional period will mirror the rules currently
applicable in the European Union. So, in general terms, EU/UK citizens who by then
benefit from free movement rights as well as their family members defined in Arti-
cle 2(2) of Directive 2004/38 and in Article 9 of the Draft Withdrawal Agreement
will fall within the scope of the Withdrawal Agreement. The devil, however, is in the
detail. Firstly, the EU has insisted on keeping the free movement rules operational
until the expiry of the transitional period, while the United Kingdom has expressed
a desire to consider the date of withdrawal as a cut-off date. Secondly, the rights of
family members of migrating EU/UK citizens have remained a bone of contention. So
far, the negotiators have managed to find a compromise in relation to the rights of ex-
isting family members, who either have already joined the EU/UK migrating citizens
or will join them later, even after the end of the transitional period. This extends to
children, who are born or adopted after that date.63 Furthermore, the United Kingdom
as well as the EU Member States will have the obligation to facilitate entry and res-
idence of the partners of EU/UK citizens who, although not resident at the specified
date in the host country, will join their existing partners at a later stage. The Joint Re-
port makes it clear that such rights will be provided in national legislation. Although
the above-mentioned compromise allowed for closure of the first, and opening of the
second phase of the withdrawal negotiations, it does not cover all possible scenar-
ios. For instance, the Joint Report provides that the rights of family members not
benefiting from the agreed rules will be regulated in national laws.64 This includes,
exempli gratia, the rights of future spouses of EU/UK migrating citizens, who tie the
knot or become partners only after the specified date. As mentioned by the European
Commission in its Communication of 8 December 2017, this very matter is due to be
attended to during the second phase of the negotiations as it is inherently linked to
the future relations between the European Union and the United Kingdom. However,
the Draft Withdrawal Agreement, which was prepared by the EU, does not exactly
mirror the Joint Report and it follows the EU’s negotiating position, leaving very lit-
tle to future negotiations. As per Article 9(e) of the Draft Withdrawal Agreement, the
family members include all family members who do not reside in the host country
with EU/UK migrating citizen at the end of the transitional period. This, as explained
in the footnote to the provision in question, covers also future partners/spouses of
EU/UK citizens. The question is whether the proposed version of Article 9(e) of the
Draft Withdrawal Agreement is acceptable to the United Kingdom. It is likely to
become a stumbling block when the negotiations recommence.
One of the thorny issues, which was the subject of the negotiations throughout
2017, was the exact status of EU/UK citizens after the specified date. Since the United
Kingdom expressed a desire to end free movement of persons as soon as possible it
has also proposed the establishment of ‘settled status’ for EU migrating citizens, who
exercise their free movement rights before the specified date. Although this was not
63Para. 12 of the Joint Report and Art. 9(e)(iii) of the Draft Withdrawal Agreement.
64Para. 14 of the Joint Report.
When Cives Europae became bargaining chips: free movement. . . 481
welcomed with open arms by the European Union, the agreed solution clearly ac-
commodates the wishes of the United Kingdom. According to Sect. 16 of the Joint
Report, both the UK and the Member States ‘can require persons concerned to apply
to obtain a status conferring the rights of residence as provided for by the Withdrawal
Agreement’. This is reflected in Article 17 of the Draft Withdrawal Agreement. In
practice, it means that the United Kingdom may go ahead with the development of
national legislation converting the rights currently enjoyed by EU citizens and their
family members into settled status and require registration of the beneficiaries. The
agreed solution comprises a number of requirements and benchmarks to guarantee
that EU citizens and their family members are not easily deprived of their existing
rights. One can argue that the strict language employed by the drafters demonstrates
limited trust in the future arrangements that will be developed by the UK authorities.
However, this should not come as a surprise, bearing in mind very unfortunate and
well-publicised blunders by the Home Office, which in the past months has developed
a tendency to send deportation letters to EU citizens and their family members who,
qua EU law, have the right to reside in the United Kingdom.65 The agreed solutions
make it unequivocally clear that any procedures, that are set up will be ‘transparent,
smooth and streamlined’.66 Furthermore, only strictly necessary information to prove
the entitlement to benefit from settled status may be required. In this respect, the Draft
Withdrawal Agreement follows the current regime based on Directive 2004/38/EC.
Furthermore, any unnecessary administrative burdens will be prohibited, while forms
to be completed by the applicants should be, as per Article 17(f) of the Draft With-
drawal Agreement be ‘short, simple, user-friendly and adjusted to the context of this
Agreement’. This may be easily considered as a reaction to the infamous over 80
pages long form, which EU citizens had to fill out in order to apply for the (declara-
tory) permanent residence card. Bearing in mind the high levels of unpreparedness
on the English side of the channel, the Draft Withdrawal Agreement provides in Arti-
cle 17(b) for a time limit of at least two years post the expiry of the transitional period
for submission of applications. It should be noted that the period of grace, referred
to as ‘period of blanket permission’ was already envisaged in the UK’s position of
June 2017 where Whitehall committed itself to giving ‘adequate time to apply for
[. . . ] new residence status after [. . . ] exit’, in total for up to two years.67 The Draft
Withdrawal Agreement requires any decisions to be made in accordance with objec-
tive criteria. As per Article 12(4) of the Draft Withdrawal Agreement, no discretion
will be allowed to be exercised by the immigration authorities unless in favour of the
applicants. Any decisions taken by relevant national authorities will be amenable to
redress mechanisms and judicial control.
In order to acquire the right to reside, the pre-conditions will be the same as cur-
rently applicable under EU law, including Articles 21, 45 and 49 TFEU as well as
Article 6 et al. of Directive 2004/38/EC.68 The same goes for the right of perma-
65See, for instance, Warrell [43].
66As per para. 17(e) of the Joint Report, the residence documents will be issued either ‘free of charge or
for a charge not exceeding that imposed on nationals for issuing of similar documents’.
67See UK Government: The United Kingdom’s Exit from the European Union. Safeguarding the Position
of EU Citizens Living in the UK and UK Nationals Living in the EU, Cm 9464, June 2017, p. 4 and p. 9.
68See Art. 12 of the Draft Withdrawal Agreement.
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nent residence, which may be acquired in accordance with Articles 16 et al. of Di-
rective 2004/38/EC. In case of the latter, the agreed regime takes into account the
already mentioned fact that many EU citizens residing in the United Kingdom have
rushed to obtain their permanent residence cards. In paragraph 23 of the Joint Report,
the parties agreed that these documents will be ‘converted into the new document
free of charge, subject only to verification of identity’ as well as security checks and
confirmation of on-going residence. This is confirmed in Article 17 (h) of the Draft
Withdrawal Agreement. Furthermore, absences from the host state for up to five con-
secutive years should not deprive those EU citizens of their rights (Article 14(3) of
the Draft Withdrawal Agreement).
During the negotiations a particular problem arose in relation to UK citizens re-
siding in the European Union. While under the discussed rules their acquired rights
to reside in the host country will be protected by the Withdrawal Agreement, this will
not stretch to free movement rights per se. To put it differently, after Brexit (or expiry
of the transitional regime) the UK citizens will not have the right to move and reside
freely within the European Union. Unless a tailor-made regime is negotiated during
the second phase of the negotiations, the UK citizens will become covered by EU
acquis on third country nationals, including the need to obtain Schengen visas for
residence.
As is well known, EU free movement rights cover not only the right to enter and
to reside but also they protect individuals from unjustified restrictions. This is now
regulated in Articles 27 et al. contained in Directive 2004/38/EC. Bearing this in
mind the negotiators of the Withdrawal Agreement had to decide which regime would
apply to EU/UK citizens, who exercise their rights before the United Kingdom leaves
the EU (or before the transitional period expires). In this respect, paragraph 26 of the
Joint Report clarifies that any restrictions, which are related to conduct which takes
place before the expiry of the transitional period, will be governed by Chapter VI
of Directive 2004/38/EC. At the same time, any conduct after the specified date will
fall within the confines of national law. This is reflected in Article 18 of the Draft
Withdrawal Agreement.
The rights of EU migrating citizens go well beyond residence and access to work69
and also extend to cover a number of areas. To begin with, equal treatment rights
will continue to apply après Brexit, or expiry of the transitional regime.70 Further-
more, it includes, exempli gratia, co-ordination of social security legislation. In this
respect the Joint Report as well as the Draft Withdrawal Agreement provide that
the existing rules laid down in Regulations 883/200471 will apply and Article 31 of
the Draft Withdrawal Agreement provides a modus operandi for securing the homo-
geneity of the applicable legal framework. Last but not least, Chap. 3 of the Draft
Withdrawal Agreement also extends to recognition of professional qualifications72
69See Art. 22 of the Draft Withdrawal Agreement.
70See para. 31 of the Joint Report and Art. 21 of the Draft Withdrawal Agreement.
71Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the
coordination of social security systems [2004] OJ L 166/1.
72Directive 2005/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 September 2005 on the recog-
nition of professional qualifications [2005] OJ L 255/22.
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including lawyers73 and approved statutory auditors,74 which will be grandfathered
after withdrawal (or expiry of transitional period).
Another important aspect of free movement rights that was subject to Brexit nego-
tiations is their enforcement at the national level. This is of particular concern when
it comes to the United Kingdom, as with the day of Brexit, or at the latest, the expiry
of the transitional regime, it will cut its ties with EU law and its enforcement. This
will be sealed by the entry into force of the currently debated Withdrawal Bill, which,
in turn, will repeal the European Communities Act 1972.75 The latter has facilitated
the direct application of EU law ever since the United Kingdom joined the European
Communities. One should note that the United Kingdom is a dualist country and
therefore, the application of international law depends every time on formal transfor-
mation by the Parliament. Bearing this in mind, it does not come as a surprise that the
EU negotiators have been particularly concerned how the Withdrawal Agreement,
in particular the sections devoted to citizens’ rights, will be applied après Brexit.
Furthermore, as demonstrated above, the legal regime envisaged there is largely an-
chored in the EU acquis, which triggered a justified question as to how to secure
uniform interpretation of the agreed rules. The Joint Report provides solutions in this
respect and detailed rules are provided in the Draft Withdrawal Agreement. The basic
arrangements are as follows. As per Article 4(4) of the Draft Withdrawal Agreement,
the key concepts ‘are to be interpreted in conformity with the relevant case law of
the Court of Justice of the European Union handed down before the end of the tran-
sition period’. As insisted by the European Union, the Court will remain the ultimate
arbiter and UK administrative authorities and courts, after the expiry of the transi-
tional period, will have the obligation to have ‘due regard’ to the jurisprudence of the
Luxembourg court (Article 4(5) of the Draft Withdrawal Agreement). Furthermore,
the Draft Withdrawal Agreement envisages a preliminary ruling mechanism allow-
ing the UK courts to proceed with references to the Court of Justice if litigation is
triggered at the national level within eight years from the date when the regime on
citizens’ rights laid down in the Withdrawal Agreement becomes applicable (Article
151 of the Draft Withdrawal Agreement). In addition to this, a requirement for ex-
change of information between UK courts and the Court of Justice is laid down in
Article 156 of the Draft Withdrawal Agreement, the UK government will have the
right to intervene in cases regarding the Withdrawal Agreement pending at Kirchberg
(Article 154 of the Draft Withdrawal Agreement). In the same vein, the European
Commission will be guaranteed the right to intervene in cases before UK courts and
tribunals (Article 155 of the Draft Withdrawal Agreement). The Joint Report as well
as the Draft Withdrawal Agreement also attend to public enforcement of the agreed
rules. On the EU side, this function will be performed by the European Commission
73Directive 98/5/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 1998 to facilitate
practice of the profession of lawyer on a permanent basis in a Member State other than that in which the
qualification was obtained [1998] OJ L 77/36.
74Directive 2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2006 on statutory audits
of annual accounts and consolidated accounts, amending Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC
and repealing Council Directive 84/253/EEC [2006] OJ L 157/87.
75See further Nicol [33]; Howe [19].
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in accordance with the infringement procedures modi operandi. The United King-
dom will have an obligation to create an independent national authority to handle,
among others, individual complaints. It is notable that nuts and bolts in this respect
belong to the leftovers, which are due to be attended to during the second phase of the
withdrawal negotiations. However, Article 152 of the Draft Withdrawal Agreement
already provides for a skeleton framework.
3.4 Transitional regime
As already mentioned, Article 50 TEU envisages a two-year period during which
the European Union and a departing Member State are supposed to reach an agree-
ment governing the terms of exit, taking account of future relations. Should that not
happen, and the two-year period were not extended, a Member State would leave
unilaterally without any formal arrangement. For anyone au courant with EU law
and decision-making procedures it is rather obvious that this deadline is, if not im-
possible, then at least very difficult to meet. Not surprisingly the Brexit negotiations
have not, during the first year, progressed at a spectacular speed. Hence, in early 2018
both sides embarked on negotiations for a transitional regime.76 This, as one could
have expected, was easier said than done. When this article was completed the for-
mal talks had not even started, yet a number of preparatory documents adopted by
EU institutions in late 2017 drew a clear picture of what could be expected. At the
same time, the early reactions of the UK government and, more broadly, the UK’s
political elite, have proved that it may be very difficult to square the circle. Against
this background, the European Union prepared a set of provisions and inserted them
into the Draft Withdrawal Agreement (Articles 121–126). This is likely to serve as
the basis for further negotiations.
Since any transitional deal would have pivotal consequences for the free move-
ment rights of EU/UK citizens, it was essential to put the existing proposals under
scrutiny to make the present analysis as comprehensive as the dynamic political envi-
ronment permitted. The starting point for any talks about transition will be the status
of the United Kingdom during that crucial phase. Internal UK politics dictate that the
United Kingdom will leave the European Union on 29 March 2019, that is exactly
two years after notification of its intention to leave the European Union. Although it
would have been way more beneficial to seek extension of the two-year period laid
down in Article 50 TEU, the UK authorities signaled their firm belief that leaving
the EU in 2019 was the only way forward.77 Bearing this in mind, the European
Union prepared for itself a negotiation mandate based on the premise that during
the period of transition the United Kingdom would already be a third country, how-
ever still a participant in the Internal Market and Customs Union. Thus, a crucial
dossier that would have to be negotiated in 2018 was the extent to which it would
be bound by EU acquis, in particular EU primary and secondary legislation on free
movement rights. In this respect the position of the European Union was seemingly
firm and unified. The United Kingdom would leave the European Union as planned,
76For a comprehensive overview see, inter alia, Łazowski [28], p. 845.
77This argument is based on the present authors’ earlier publications. See Franztiou/Łazowski [13].
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it would not have members in the EU institutions and, consequentially, it would not
participate in EU decision-making. This is made clear in Article 6 of the Draft With-
drawal Agreement.78 At the same time, it would remain bound by the EU acquis in
its entirety, including any revisions or new legal acts adopted during the transition
period (Article 122 of the Draft Withdrawal Agreement). This surely would extend
to relevant primary and secondary legislation on movement rights. Should that hap-
pen, all principles and rules in relation to the grandfathered rights would only enter
into force not at the date of Brexit (29 March 2019) but when the transitional period
expires. This is reflected in the Draft Withdrawal Agreement, which treats the end
of the transitional regime as the cut-off date. According to Article 121 of the Draft
Withdrawal Agreement that would take place on 31 December 2020.79 It should be
remembered, however, that none of this is set in stone. Firstly, when this article was
completed, it was unclear if the United Kingdom was ready to swallow such a bit-
ter pill, putting it at a very disadvantaged position. The early reactions to the EU’s
negotiating position indicated that it wished to end the free movement of persons on
the date of Brexit. It was unclear how such contrasting positions on both sides could
be reconciled. Secondly, the conclusion and approval of the Withdrawal Agreement
was also far from being a fait accompli. To put it differently, an option of unilateral
withdrawal remained on the cards. Thirdly, in theoretical terms, one could also en-
visage a scenario whereby the two-year period would be extended and then followed
by a transitional regime. If that were to happen, the free movement of persons would
continue for years to come. With all those uncertainties in place one thing was clear.
In early 2018 the state of affairs can only be characterised as an epicenter of chaos
and uncertainty, affecting millions of EU citizens.
3.5 Post-Brexit rights of EU and UK citizens
The analysis presented thus far has provided an overview of the solutions agreed,
which—providing that the Withdrawal Agreement enters into force—will apply to
EU/UK citizens who exercise their free movement rights before the exit date or by
the end of the transitional period. Such a limitation is hardly surprising as the centre
of gravity during the first phase of Brexit negotiations was on already acquired rights.
However, as the exit talks entered their second phase, the negotiators were expected
to move on from the terms of withdrawal to future relations between the EU and
the UK. Not surprisingly, immigration matters were expected to bounce back like a
boomerang, together with the already mentioned few leftovers remaining unsolved
after the first stage of negotiations. Although the general direction of travel was still
to be decided, mainly due a short supply of credible plans and ideas at Whitehall,
one thing was clear: Brexit meant Brexit and definitely the end of free movement
of persons. It is notable that the UK government as early as 2017 announced the
creation of a new immigration regime, even though in the period that followed it has
kept on delaying publication of detailed plans. When this article was completed, the
78See also Art. 123(3) of the Draft Withdrawal Agreement.
79See also, exempli gratia, European Commission: Position Paper “Transitional Arrangements in the With-
drawal Agreement”, TF50 (2018) 30, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/
files/transition.pdf.
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publication of policy papers on the future immigration regime was pushed till the late
autumn of 2018. At the same time, the business community as well as representatives
of the agricultural sector were vocally expressing their concerns about post-Brexit
reality and the fact that staff shortages were already starting to bite. Bearing in mind
all these uncertainties one has to resort to the analysis of a few theoretical options,
which potentially may be taken on board during the negotiations of future relations
between the EU and the UK. They are presented in turn.
The first option is continuation of the existing regime qua a future agreement be-
tween the EU and the United Kingdom. Although, the political winds are not very
promising and such an option is unlikely to materialise, one has to emphasise that,
at least in theoretical terms, it may be on the cards. Experience proves that the free
movement of persons may be extended to third countries, which pursues one of the
models of deep integration with the European Union without actual membership. This
has been referred to by the present author as, depending on circumstances, enhanced
multilateralism or enhanced bilateralism.80 The example of the first is the European
Economic Area, while the latter can be exemplified by the EU-Swiss Agreement on
free movement of persons. Both models have one thing in common: the obligation
imposed on the third countries to apply the relevant EU acquis. However, there is no
one-size-fits-all approach. The European Economic Area has homogeneity and dy-
namism written into its DNA. To put it differently, the EEA-EFTA countries have to
follow the EU acquis as it evolves and thus annexes to the EEA Agreement are regu-
larly updated by the Joint Committees. The EU-Swiss framework is at the other end
of the spectrum as it gives Switzerland considerable room for manoeuvre, which—as
experience proves—it is quite happy to exercise. For instance, the Swiss government
has refused to accept Directive 2004/38/EC and, therefore, the current EU-Swiss
framework agreement on free movement of persons is largely based on EU secondary
legislation, which was repealed in 2006. Furthermore, the future of this arrangement
is now in doubt, as the Swiss government struggles to accommodate the will of its
citizens expressed in a referendum held in 2016. Irrespective of those idiosyncrasies,
these two models facilitate free movement of persons with countries remaining out-
side of the European Union. If, in an unlikely scenario, the EU and the UK opted
for a comparable arrangement for their future relations, it would have to be given ef-
fect in the future general agreement between the two sides or in a tailor-made treaty.
Bearing in mind the Swiss experience, the EU is very unlikely going to agree to any
arrangement along the Helvetic lines. More likely, any arrangements on immigration,
if at all approved by both sides, would find their home in a comprehensive free trade
agreement. Yet, as already alluded to, the politics of Brexit make this option a very
unlikely scenario.
The second option is a very basic regime modelled on the majority of agreements
that the EU has with its neighbouring countries. For instance, the Association Agree-
ments with the former Soviet Union countries,81 or the Stabilisation and Association
80Łazowski [24].
81Association Agreement between the European Union, the European Atomic Energy Community and
their Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part [2014] OJ L 161/3; Association Agree-
ment between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States,
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Agreements with the Western Balkans82 leave access to residence and work in the
hands of the national authorities, yet they envisage a general non-discrimination right
applicable to those who reside legally in the EU or in one of its neighbours. In matters
not regulated by such agreements, the secondary legislation on immigration applies
on the EU side and national rules in the third countries. When it comes to the first,
it includes, exempli gratia, directives on long term residence83 or family reunifica-
tion.84
The third option is a complete lack of any bilateral regime covering movement of
natural persons. Should that be a desired way forward, it would leave the matters of
immigration solely in the hands of the EU and its Member States, on the one side and
the United Kingdom, on the other. If this scenario were to materialise, UK citizens
residing at the time of Brexit, or by expiry of the transitional regime in one of the
EU Member States as well as those who move after one of those dates to an EU
Member State, would fall under the already mentioned EU secondary legislation on
immigration and relevant national rules. EU citizens, who try their luck in the United
Kingdom after Brexit, or expiry of the transitional regime, would remain solely under
the confines of its, for now largely undefined, immigration rules.
This rather general fishing expedition demonstrates only a handful of options,
which are available to the negotiators. Time will tell which variation is opted for,
though current trends indicate a very modest resolution at the treaty level with a lot
of discretion left to the EU Member States and the United Kingdom.
3.6 Rights of EU/UK citizens in case of a unilateral Brexit
When this article went to print the objective of the European Union and the United
Kingdom was to ensure an orderly exit, based on a proper legal framework. However,
although the agreement on the first phase of negotiations was reached in December
2017 and the negotiations entered their second phase, a conclusion and timely entry
into force of the Withdrawal Agreement should not be treated as a fait accompli. To
put it differently, one should also take into account that the United Kingdom may
leave the European Union on 29 March 2019 without any formal deal. Bearing this
in mind, it is essential to consider the implications of such an unregulated exit for the
rights of EU/UK nationals exercising their free movement rights prior to Brexit.
of the one part, and Georgia, of the other part [2014] OJ L 261/4; Association Agreement between the Eu-
ropean Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and
the Republic of Moldova, of the other part [2014] OJ L 260/4.
82Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States,
of the one part, and the Republic of Albania, of the other part [2009] OJ L 107/166; Stabilisation and
Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part,
and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, of the other part [2004] OJ L 84/13; Stabilisation and
Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States of the one part, and
the Republic of Montenegro, of the other part [2010] OJ L 108/3; Stabilisation and Association Agreement
between the European Communities and their Member States of the one part, and the Republic of Serbia,
of the other part [2013] OJ L 278/14.
83Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third-country nationals
who are long-term residents [2004] OJ L 16/44.
84Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification [2003] OJ L
251/12.
488 A. Łazowski
To begin with, a unilateral exit would create a legal vacuum of massive propor-
tions. As far as trade is concerned, the parties would be bound by the WTO frame-
work, which extends to many aspects of trade, yet it falls short of addressing im-
migration matters.85 Consequentially, as of the date of withdrawal, EU law would
cease to apply and would not be replaced by any alternative legal regime applica-
ble between the European Union and the United Kingdom. To put it differently, the
immigration status of EU citizens residing in the UK would fall primarily under na-
tional law, while UK citizens residing in the European Union would be covered by
a combination of EU legislation applicable to third country nationals and domestic
law. Although it is true that several provisions of human rights treaties would also
apply, their enforceability would be a far cry from the standards established in the
EU legal order.86 Bearing this in mind, a unilateral withdrawal not regulated properly
should be considered merely as an academic proposition and should have been ex-
cluded ab initio by the EU and the UK. Alas, this has not been the case and, as things
stood when this article was completed, it was also considered as a viable option by
members of the UK Conservative Party.
4 Conclusions
EU citizenship is the fundamental status of nationals of the Member States. This is
a well known mantra emerging from consistent jurisprudence of the Court of Jus-
tice, starting with the landmark judgment in case C-85/96 Martinez Sala.87 In many
ways it seems to be set in stone. Yet not all beneficiaries of the concept in question
seem to be content with what this fundamental status provides for. As is well-known,
the majority of voters who cast their ballot in the UK referendum opted to give up
voluntarily their EU citizenship and all the rights that come with it. Therefore, to a
degree, the results of the referendum amount to failure of EU citizenship. Further-
more, EU citizenship may be perceived as a victim of its success. On the one hand,
nationals of the Member States which joined the EU in the last fifteen years have
eagerly exercised their free movement rights. On the other hand, it did not come
to the liking of the majority covered by the franchise in the referendum. It is no-
body’s secret that immigration was one of the leitmotifs of the referendum campaign,
even though the United Kingdom benefits from the opt-out in Schengen acquis and,
hence, largely has autonomy to decide on its immigration policy vis-à-vis third coun-
tries. Not surprisingly the acquired rights of EU/UK citizens have become one of
the priority areas in the Brexit negotiations. However, as experience proves, squaring
the circle between political declarations and negotiations of actual law may prove
to be—if not impossible—then at least a very complicated affair. Despite reassuring
statements, the UK government has not provided unilateral guarantees, which would
85See House of Lords: Brexit: deal or no deal, HL 46, available at: https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/
ld201719/ldselect/ldeucom/46/46.pdf.
86See Hughes [20], p. 94.
87Case C-85/96 María Martínez Sala v Freistaat Bayern, EU:C:1998:217; Case C-413/99 Baumbast and
R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, EU:C:2002:493.
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demonstrate its good will and desire to keep the rights of EU citizens, who have al-
ready exercised their rights or will do so before Brexit, untouched. In accordance
with statistical data, many EU citizens decided to migrate to other Member States
(including their countries of nationality). Others opted to sit and wait for whatever
the future brings or to file for naturalisation. Many UK citizens, who reside in the EU
Member States proceeded along similar lines. If the Withdrawal Agreement enters
into force and contains all the guarantees envisaged in the Joint Report and the Draft
Withdrawal Agreement published on 28 February 2018, it should serve as a robust
legal framework for protection of the acquired rights. However, much will depend
on the actual enforcement of the adopted rules. The mishaps which the Home Of-
fice has experienced since the referendum send very worrying signals in this respect.
Furthermore, the post-Brexit immigration regime in the United Kingdom is for now
a terra incognita. The optimal way forward is either extension of the two-year pe-
riod laid down in Article 50 TEU or approval and implementation of the transitional
regime, during which EU law would continue to apply in the United Kingdom. This
should allow sufficient time to prepare the legal framework and the state apparatus
for the new reality. At the other end of the spectrum is an unregulated withdrawal,
which would create a legal tsunami. Either way, EU/UK citizens who have exercised
their fundamental right guaranteed by EU law are faced with an era of unprecedented
uncertainty, which could have been avoided. Furthermore, it is very likely that high
volumes of litigation will follow. The most recent reference for preliminary ruling
submitted by a Dutch court to the Court of Justice gives a taste of what is to follow.88
Whatever the future brings, one thing seems to be certain: with the spectre of Brexit,
citoyens européens became bargaining chips.
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